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The ͞Weisďrod Quadrileŵŵa͟ reǀisited: 
insurance incentives on new health 
technologies 
June 2012 
Joan Costa-Font1; Alistair McGuire1; Victoria Serra-Sastre2*;  
Abstract 
The effect of insurance expansion on the diffusion of new technologies is not a well-understood phenomenon. Arguably, an 
expansion of insurance coverage provides a motivation for R&D investment in medical technologies. Although risk pooling 
through insurance gives rise to greater affordability for existing treatments and becomes a volume driver of new 
treatments, it may also influence provider reimbursement through a monopsony purchaser effect and related cost control 
measures. However the impact that insurance has on technology availability and R&D investment, and more generally on 
the adoption of new technologies remains an unexplored empirical question. This paper presents evidence of a link 
between insurance and technology diffusion using OECD panel data and taking advantage of a dynamic specification 
structure. Our empirical estimates indicate that higher degrees of private expenditure on health care correlate with higher 
levels of R&D in health care, consistent with the hypothesis forwarded by Weisbrod that increasing insurance coverage 
gives boosts technology adoption. However our findings also suggest that increasing public funding of health care appears 
to lower technological adoption, which is, of course, consistent with the exercising of monopsony power and an objective 
of cost containment. 
Keywords: insurance, technology diffusion, health technologies. 
JEL: I18. 
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 2 
Introduction 
    
    In the last few decades, most western health systems have experienced a dramatic expansion of 
health expenditures together with a growth in the diffusion of new technologies. As a result, it 
appears to be a widely accepted notion that health care technology is a major driver of health care 
expenditure (Smith et al, 2010). At first glance this may appear at odds with commonly held views 
that technology supposedly produces a substitution effect that lowers unit costs and increases 
productivity. However as documented by Huckman and Cutler (2003), while a "substitution effect" 
does exist, a simultaneous "treatment expansion effect" might actually dominate, which essentially 
would lead us to conclude that technology adoption leads to demand shifting and subsequent 
expenditure increases. One has to be careful in making these conjectures however, as demand may 
also be shifting in response to quality improvements embedded in new technology (Enggleston et al 
(2011)3. 
     
    A further nuance in this technology/expenditure relationship arises from the fact that health care 
demand is financed through insurance; whether this is privately or socially based. Consumer 
willingness to pay is of course liable to be higher under insurance than in its absence (Zweifel, 2003; 
Zweifel and Manning, 2000). Thus health care demand expansion is more easily assured when third-
party payment is present. Insurance also exerts supply effects through increasing the contribution 
base to finance future innovations, while reducing fragmentation and uncertainty in the market from 
the innovators perspective. In the western world we have observed significant expansion of health 
care insurance converge, primarily through public insurance coverage. Hence, one might expect that 
following this expansion of insurance coverage, faster adoption of new technology would also be 
seen. There has however been limited empirical evidence to substantiate this behaviour. 
     
    It is plausible that new health care technology shifts demand through allowing more patients to 
benefit from treatment and/or through an increased quality embedded in new treatments. This 
increased demand is serviced through improved access, made possible by insurance. Rapidly the 
expectations associated with improved technology and increased access creates a self fulfilling cycle. 
Indeed, Weisbrod (1991) was among the first to suggest that growing health care insurance provides 
an incentive for the development and provision of new health care technology. Expanding health 
care coverage has a direct incentive impact through broader coverage of treatments and indirectly 
through enabling additional demand expansion by increasing insurance coverage of the population.  
Weisbrod (1991) further asserted that it was as a result of the expansion of health care insurance 
coverage that there has been a widespread development of cost-increasing technologies in the 
health care sector, and that this improved market access for consumers was the mechanism through 
which health care technology is quickly adopted and leads to growing health care expenditure. There 
is a small theoretical literature (Goddeeris, 1984; Zweifel, 2003; Zweifel and Manning, 2000) which 
                                                          
3
 Enggleston et al (2011) show for the case of diabetes care that once health expenditure is adjusted by 
quality, it is no longer true that health expenditures for diabetes care have expanded in the last decades. 
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support this supposition in suggesting that insurance imparts a bias in favour of cost-increasing 
(product) innovation rather than cost-reducing (process) innovation. Hence, health care expenditure 
growth can be partly explained by the interaction of growing insurance coverage and technology 
development. 
     
    On the other hand, the health care insurance sector, especially the development of universal and 
publicly integrated systems, has a tendency to promote monopsony purchasing. This is not only true 
of social insurance, but also of private insurance where common insurance pools tend to increase in 
efficiency as they enlarge. Such monopsony power allows greater control over treatment restrictions 
and cost containment, although with some potential detrimental effects on social welfare (Pauly, 
1988). Bech et al (2010) provide evidence that systems with monopsony payers tend to have lower 
rates of technology adoption for heart disease, than systems which do not exhibit this characteristic. 
While some systems may have a tendency to monopsony, most health care systems are 
characterised by mixed purchasing of some kind, however. Either supplementary private insurance 
within a dominant social insurance setting or mixed insurance schemes tend to be the most 
prevalent form of health care system. Where the insurance market is more fragmented, the 
possibility that insurance firms compete on quality implies that the direct control of treatment costs, 
including those associated with the adoption of new technologies, may become more difficult. 
     
    There is a growing literature on the determinants of health care expenditure with technology 
playing a central role (Newhouse (1992), Fuchs (1984), Okunade and Murthy (2002), Cutler (2004), 
Jones (2004)). Few have focussed on the role of insurance coverage, although Smith et al (2010) 
have estimated that greater insurance coverage accounts for approximately 10% of the per annum 
increase in health care expenditure growth, somewhat below the impact that technological factors 
per se have on per annum expenditure growth (somewhere between 27% and 48%). There has also 
been work on the return to health care technology that has focused on estimating quality adjusted 
price indexes, finding that the quality-adjusted price of health care over the recent decades has been 
roughly stable (Berndt et al (2000), Cutler et al (1998), Cutler and McClellan (2001); Egglestone et al ( 
2011)). Examination of technology adoption trends in the treatment of heart attack finds different 
up-take rates across a range of systems (McClellan and Kessler (2002); TECH Research Network 
(2001); Bech et al (2010)). 
     
    There has been little explicit investigation of the relationship between health care technology 
adoption and insurance coverage. This paper is an attempt to give a first empirical take on this 
relationship using aggregate data on health care systems as the unit of analysis. We take advantage 
of the existing data available on both public and private insurance coverage, as well as on key new 
health care technologies for OECD countries. 
     
    We are concerned with the impact of insurance cover on investment in health care technologies 
and R&D volume to reflect this investment. Following Weisbrod (1991) we assume that R&D and the 
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up-take of new technology are determined by the mechanisms expected to be used to finance 
health care. New technology is empirically defined by a diagnostic technology, MRI scanners, and a 
surgical intervention, Percutaneous Transluminal Angioplasty (PTCA). In particular, Weisbrod (1991) 
explicitly hypothesises that the effect of insurance on R&D, is not simply based on expected demand 
but the future form of insurance, which determines the strength of the market for new products. 
Thus, for example, public funding of health care may, through the pursuit of cost-containment 
dampen the market for new products. This gives a rationale for empirically investigating the dynamic 
process through which different forms of funding interacts with R&D and the diffusion of new 
products. Weisbrod (1991) argues there is a circularity in the relationship between insurance and 
R&D, and to a lesser extent the up-take of new technology. With increasing insurance coverage 
providing an incentive to invest in R&D, and the new health care technologies developed from this 
R&D investment providing the demand for greater insurance coverage.  We exploit aggregate 
demand at the country level and dynamic relationships between these variables to assess one 
dimension of this process; namely the impact of insurance on R&D and health care technology. We 
therefore build on the earlier literature by providing some aggregate empirical estimates on these 
relationships to test whether there is support for this part of the Weisbrod hypothesis.  
 
To further motivate our empirical investigation we outline the variation in trends across a number of 
OECD countries for a number of our principle variables. Figure 1 shows the evolution of R&D in 
health for few OECD countries during the time period 1990-2010. Some countries show a clear 
upward trend in R&D investment whereas others have a slight increase or even a flat trend. The 
issue that the paper explores is whether variation in insurance coverage has any significant effect on 
these trends. 
Figure 1. R&D in health (/per capita, $US purchasing power parity) 
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 As technology is multivariate we consider specific examples. First, a diagnostic input, MRI scanners, 
ǁhiĐh refleĐts Weisďrod’s ŶotioŶ of a Đostly teĐhŶology iŶtroduĐed through iŶsuraŶĐe Đoǀerage 
incentivizing an ever-widening concept of health care coverage. Second, a surgical procedure, PTCA, 
associated with demand shifting made possible by insurance coverage. We examine the volume of 
their use in different health care systems according to the variation in the form and coverage of 
health care insurance. Figures 2 and 3 display the patterns of such technologies over the last two 
decades 1990-2010 as an illustration of the remarkable differences in technology diffusion across 
countries, which appears to increase after the mid-1990s.  
Figure 2. PTCA (per 100,000 population) for a selection of countries 
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Source: OECD Health Data 2012 
Figure 3. MRI (per million population) for a selection of countries 
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Following Comin and Hobjn (2010) we can define horizontal shifts to reflect differences in lags of 
new embodied technology across countries, while vertical shifts reflect, amongst other factors, the 
size of the treatment market and the overall productivity level. A steeper pathway implies later 
adoption and longer adoption lag relative to the initial adopter. We are particularly interested in 
whether or not different forms of health care insurance coverage can explain these differences. We 
would specifically expect that growth in private coverage would have a positive impact on health 
care technology investment and growth, while higher public sector coverage may counter this effect 
to the extent that regulations on cost containment are effective. Figure 4 shows the trends for 
private out-of-pocket expenditure on health (in per capita terms, US$ PPP). Although we can see 
there is a negligible upward trend, differences across countries may reflect differences in technology 
availability and R&D. 
 
Figure 4. Private Out-of-Pocket Expenditure (/per capita, US$ PPP) for a selection of countries 
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Source: OECD Health Data 2012 
 
    Such variation across these variables supports further investigation and the paper continues as 
follows. The next section describes our data, empirical strategy and preliminary evidence. Section 
three reports the main results and section four concludes. 
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Data and methods 
 
Data 
  
    As noted above we are interested in the impact that insurance coverage has on health care 
technology development and adoption. Specifically we wish to document the influence of different 
health care insurance systems on technology diffusion, assuming, in line with Weisbrod (1991) that 
greater coverage and higher private expenditure leads to increased diffusion.  In addition, we also 
examine the relationship that Weisbrod (1991) suggested between R&D and insurance 
arrangements. The argument posed by Weisbrod (1991) being that investment in R&D is related to 
the expectation generated regarding the structure of the health insurance system.   
     
    We take advantage of the cross-country variability in R&D levels, technology up-take and 
insurance patterns, as well as the variation in institutional structures to identify these relationships. 
Specifically, we use aggregate OECD Health data4 on different health care systems, which are 
available from 1980 to 2010. The main variables of interest are the technology variables, insurance 
variables and R&D in health. As technology variables we use the number of MRI scanners (per 
million population) and the number of PTCA (per 100,000 population), given that, though introduced 
relatively recently, there is adequate time series to assess diffusion. Our insurance variables include 
total private expenditure on health care, defined by the OECD as private insurance, private 
household out-of-pocket expenditure, non-profit institutions serving households and other 
corporations; total public expenditure from all public funds; and private out-of-pocket expenditure 
that is an aggregate of any out-of-pocket expenditure, cost sharing from government or social 
security funds, cost-sharing from private insurance (deductibles and coinsurance) and all other type 
of cost-sharing. As such the private out-of-pocket expenditure also contributes to the private 
expenditure variable. A number of control variables are also included in the estimation.     
 
    The data contain a large number of countries and cover a substantial time period (1980 -2010). 
There are differences in data availability for each of the variables used in the empirical analysis and 
consequently the panel we have is unbalanced. An additional data issue is that some countries did 
not provide data for all periods and there are data points with irregular time spans5. Therefore we 
use data for each country for which there were consecutive data points. A list of the variables 
included in the analysis and some descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. Noting the estimated 
raw means and standard deviations displayed by the data, Table 1 reveals significant cross-country 
variability in technology adoption and in private insurance coverage, government funding of health 
                                                          
4
OECD Countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United 
States.  
5
 Data availability is limited for some countries and some cross-sections do not provide information in one or more of the 
relevant technology or R&D variables. 
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care and out-of pocket expenditure. It is this variability that we use to identify the relationships 
between health care insurance structures and R&D and technology up-take. 
     
    Table 1. Variables List and descriptive statistics. 
Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
MRIs 
MRIs (Per million population in 
logs) 
6.16 5.42 0.04 22.01 
PTCA 
PTCA (Per 100,000 population in 
logs) 
141.01 106.92 0.20 582.20 
R&D 
R&D on health (/per capita, US$ 
PPP in logs) 
33.49 34.63 0.29 147.80 
POut 
Private households out-of-pocket 
expenditure (/per capita, US$ PPP 
in logs) 
351.23 232.47 14.25 1649.97 
Gov 
Government total expenditure 
(/per capita, US$ PPP in logs) 
1262.61 829.72 19.15 4501.06 
Priv 
Private total expenditure (/per 
capita, US$ PPP in logs) 
491.51 498.86 14.25 4165.39 
Female Proportion of female population 0.51 0.01 0.49 0.54 
Pop15to64 
Proportion population aged 
between 15 and 64 
0.67 0.02 0.57 0.73 
Pop65over 
Proportion population aged 65 and 
over 
0.13 0.04 0.04 0.22 
Beds 
Hospital Beds (Per 1,000 
population) 
5.85 2.62 1.56 15.60 
GDP GDP (/capita, US$ PPP in logs) 21098.28 11124.10 2397.00 90539.60 
 Source: OECD Health Data 2012 
     
Moreover, as displayed in Table 2, simple correlations across these aggregate variables suggests 
positive correlation between public and private insurance funding and R&D expenditures with, as 
hypothesised, private insurance exhibiting the strongest relationship. Both public and private 
insurance are also positively related to technology up-take. Private out of pocket expenditure, which 
essentially comprises co-payments and deductibles, are not surprisingly highly correlated with 
private insurance expenditures. As expected there is little correlation between R&D expenditure, 
and the technology variables, MRI scanners and PTCA rates. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix for MRIs, PTCA and R&D. 
  MRIs PTCA R&D POut Gov Priv 
MRIs 1           
PTCA 0.0394 1         
R&D -0.0239 0.09 1       
POut 0.516 0.2859 -0.0845 1     
Gov 0.501 0.3817 0.3813 0.3715 1   
Priv 0.3177 0.3672 0.5246 0.7299 0.5684 1 
 
Empirical Strategy 
     
    To examine the relationship between technology and insurance a model is estimated in the 
following specification: 
ititititit
uzinsurancectech    (1) 
      
    where the subscripts i and t index the individual country and time-period respectively in all cases. 
The dependent variable in equation (1), 
it
tech , captures the technology level for country i in year t. 
Two technologies are used: MRIs and PTCA. They are examples of diagnostic and surgical 
technologies respectively, and expressed in logarithms in the estimation given their skewed 
distribution across health care systems. The variable 
it
insurance is our variable of interest and our 
parameter of interest is β. The ǀarious iŶsuraŶĐe ǀariaďles private expenditure, government 
expenditure and out-of-pocket expenditure are all expressed in per capita terms. These insurance 
variables are used to examine if specific aspects of insurance coverage influence the level of 
technology adopted by different health care systems. The parameter 
t
  is a time-varying intercept, 
i
c  is a country fixed effect for unobservable heterogeneity and 
it
z  is a vector of various 
confounding variables ǁith assoĐiated paraŵeter γ, aŶd the fiŶal terŵ is aŶ error term
it
u . 
     
    A further speĐifiĐatioŶ ĐoŶsiders, of a siŵilar ŵaŶŶer aŶd ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith Weisďrod’s ;1991Ϳ 
explicit hypothesis that the impact of insurance is positive on R&D in health (in logs), and is given by: 
ititititit
uzinsurancecDR  &  (2) 
     
    Where
it
DR &  is the R&D expenditure on health care per capita. The controls and the fixed effects 
are the same as before. We not only test private insurance per capita as it affects R&D, but also 
examine the impact of government expenditure per capita, where we would expect the monopsony 
cost containment aspect to dominate, and the impact of private out-of-pocket expenditure where 
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we are more agnostic a priori, as the strength of insurance effect is much diluted here and the 
monopsony purchasing effect is missing.  
     
Methodological issues and preliminary testing 
     
    We use longitudinal data on 34 OECD countries with information on technology, insurance and 
R&D information. Given the time varying nature of our variables, and especially the trend 
components in technology diffusion we must examine whether the variables are stationary. Non-
stationarity of variables may lead to spurious regressions. To test for the presence of unit roots we 
use the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test which uses the average of the individual Dickey-Fuller t-
statistics for each cross-section. The test is suitable for unbalanced panels (Breitung and Pesaran, 
2005). Technology, R&D and insurance variables are tested individually for the presence of non-
stationarity. In all cases we fail to reject the null of unit root. However, when taking first differences 
of the corresponding variables and testing for non-stationarity we reject the null of unit root. We 
therefore assume our series to be I(1) and all estimates presented here will be given in first-
differences.    
 
Following Weisbrod (1991) we expect that technology development, R&D, and the manner of 
technology adoption is a function of the mechanisms expected to finance future health care, while 
the form of insurance coverage is partly a function of previous R&D levels and adopted technology. 
We are therefore interested in an empirical strategy that allows a dynamic specification and deals 
with potential endogeneity. There is a potential source of endogeneity in the insurance variables 
employed. Simultaneity of insurance, and the technology and R&D variables could lead to biased 
estimates of the relevant coefficients.  To test for endogeneity of the insurance variables, we 
obtained OECD data on general non-health insurance and used two non-health related insurance 
variables as instruments; the country specific total gross premiums (in million $US) and life insurance 
share (defined as the ratio between gross life insurance premium over the total gross premium). The 
rationale being that private health insurance coverage will be related to the general insurance 
preferences of any given population. A simple model based on estimating the effect of insurance on 
technology and R&D and using these two variables as instruments was then examined. A Hausman 
test failed to reject the null hypotheses of exogeneity and therefore the estimates presented below 
treat the insurance variables as exogenous. 
 
        In specifying a dynamic relationship we assume R&D, and the level of technology diffusion is 
dependent on the expected form of insurance prevailing in future periods. This gives us a means to 
identify whether the relationship between R&D and technology diffusion, and insurance is dynamic 
in nature. Thus, we use predicted values of the insurance variables, based on a simple autoregressive 
formulation, to capture the expectations of health care funding structure, consistent with the 
hypothesis suggested by Weisbrod (1991). We also use first differencing to exclude the country fixed 
effects and identify off this. We are primarily interested in picking up the impact of unobservables as 
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social history and preferences obviously play a role here. We therefore estimate in differences, but 
still include country effects in differenced specifications. 
   Results 
     
    This section reports the econometric results. We first present results for the first-differenced 
variables in static models in Table 3. As the results presented are from first differences in log-log 
models, the coefficients of interest represent insurance elasticities in growth terms. As can be 
observed, without taking into account the expected, potential dynamic relationship as emphasised 
by Weisbrod (1991), in general there is no statistically significant relationship between the growth in 
technology diffusion or R&D expenditure and any of the insurance variables.  
 
    We therefore move to a dynamic specification. We assume that technology adoption is a function 
of future insurance coverage. Given the lead times required to develop new health care technology 
the suppliers of this technology will rely on predicted future insurance coverage to provide 
incentives. We assume a very simple model of predictions based on prior realisations of insurance 
coverage but one that, given that it is based on the level of per capita coverage, incorporates any 
increasing coverage. In this spirit we model the technology variable in the current period and regress 
it against the predicted value of the various insurance variables. We do so first by computing an 
AR(1) model of the type: 
itiitit
ucinsuranceinsurance  1  (3)   
    for each insurance variable. We also estimated the corresponding AR(2) and AR(5) models in order 
to check whether longer lags captured the insurance dynamics better for equation 3 6 as follows: 
iti
s
k
sitkit
ucinsuranceinsurance   1  (4) 
    for s=2,5. For each AR model and each insurance variable we computed the predicted values.  
 
                                                          
6
 When computing the AR(2) and AR(5) models, only the fist lag is statistically significant and longer lags are shown to be 
statistically insignificant. 
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Table 3. Static model. First-differenced estimates for various insurance variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES MRIs PTCA R&D MRIs PTCA R&D MRIs PTCA R&D 
          
Pout 0.182 0.427 0.798       
 (0.234) (0.256) (1.061)       
Gov    0.395** 0.545 0.0802    
    (0.184) (0.450) (1.038)    
Priv       0.192 0.496** 1.050 
       (0.173) (0.231) (1.322) 
Female -19.50 50.52** 155.3* -31.03 64.59** 118.9 -20.19 69.14*** 165.6** 
 (20.88) (18.18) (81.91) (19.30) (25.37) (98.15) (21.40) (23.26) (74.76) 
Pop15to64 -1.093 33.20** -41.15 1.235 36.03*** -37.49 -1.430 35.23*** -32.54 
 (9.278) (13.04) (32.67) (9.913) (10.76) (25.26) (9.185) (11.16) (29.62) 
Pop65over -0.649 18.35 -40.69 -0.148 13.40 -33.59 -2.315 13.21 -33.71 
 (8.553) (12.48) (29.47) (7.509) (10.90) (31.55) (7.382) (11.21) (29.32) 
Beds 0.0638 0.0402 0.700 0.0439 0.0452 0.669 0.0627 0.0814 0.642 
 (0.0455) (0.0687) (0.451) (0.0472) (0.0614) (0.492) (0.0457) (0.0588) (0.414) 
GDP 0.384 -1.425*** -1.113 0.163 -1.752*** -0.760 0.367 -1.631*** -1.537 
 (0.527) (0.500) (2.515) (0.526) (0.442) (1.867) (0.496) (0.387) (2.678) 
          
Observations 221 199 171 241 232 191 241 232 191 
R-squared 0.395 0.392 0.310 0.561 0.422 0.292 0.561 0.426 0.302 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Country and time dummies included but not reported 
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These predicted values were then used as a proxy for the suppliers' expected insurance coverage as 
it affects technology adoption in the forthcoming period, directly in line with this formulation of the 
Weisbrod (1991) hypothesis. Our new model specification is given by: 
ititititit
uzinsuranceEctech    1)(  (5) 
 
        Tables 4, 5 and 6 show our main results where we include the lag expected value of the 
insurance variables, using the predicted values from the AR(1), AR(2) and AR(5). Tables 4 and 5 show 
the influence of out of pocket and private expenditure respectively. In Table 4 private total 
expenditure shows there is little of note other than the generally positive relationship between the 
growth of out-of-pocket expenditure and the growth in R&D expenditure levels. Given the 
correlation of these out-of-pocket expenditures with private insurance, the expectation that such 
demand-side risk sharing increases as private insurance coverage increases provides supportive, 
indicative evidence of the Weisbrod hypothesis. 
 
Table 5, reporting the private insurance results, confirms this with strong direct positive, dynamic 
relationships between the growth in private coverage and the growth in R&D found. Indeed in both 
the cases of out-of-pocket expenditure and private insurance, the impact of expected future 
insurance coverage appears not to influence the up-take of new technologies. One inference is that 
it is the R&D process and the development of future technologies that is influenced by insurance 
coverage as hypothesised by Weisbrod, while the current level of funding alone affects the up-take 
of technology. Table 6 reports the results of the coverage of public insurance and here there is no 
significant relationship between technology and R&D and the expected level of public insurance. It is 
important to note that this lack of significance shall not be interepreted as reflecting the monopsony 
purchasing and cost-containment effects associated with public funding, as there is no correlation 
found between these variables.  
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Table 4. First-differences results. Private household out-of-pocket expenditure (/capita, US$ PPP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES MRIs MRIs MRIs PTCA PTCA PTCA  R&D R&D R&D 
          
AR(1) t-1 -0.186   0.0785   1.526***   
 (0.198)   (0.227)   (0.393)   
AR(2) t-1  -0.176   0.0983   1.388***  
  (0.198)   (0.225)   (0.340)  
AR(5) t-1   -0.136   -0.0373   1.060*** 
   (0.189)   (0.245)   (0.243) 
Female -32.07 -31.44 -22.31 52.85** 52.58** 38.52* 163.5 161.3 191.8 
 (24.39) (24.60) (26.25) (21.05) (20.84) (22.08) (125.3) (131.1) (175.5) 
Pop15to64 -3.380 -4.876 5.058 32.28** 31.88** 19.08 -62.85* -74.29** -39.19 
 (9.523) (10.06) (12.60) (12.53) (12.53) (11.21) (33.02) (31.02) (36.93) 
Pop65over 1.274 -3.098 4.766 15.94 14.72 2.328 -72.98** -77.73** -0.928 
 (9.427) (9.272) (13.29) (12.48) (12.33) (11.59) (32.53) (28.02) (47.90) 
Beds 0.0709 0.0575 0.00578 0.0441 0.0512 -0.0117 0.952 0.970 0.547* 
 (0.0520) (0.0549) (0.0896) (0.0663) (0.0708) (0.0613) (0.555) (0.694) (0.269) 
GDP 0.542 0.575 0.450 -1.362*** -1.334*** -0.929* 0.249 0.331 3.555*** 
 (0.493) (0.496) (0.596) (0.435) (0.436) (0.516) (1.726) (1.788) (1.195) 
          
Observations 213 206 178 198 194 176 157 150 129 
R-squared 0.397 0.405 0.425 0.370 0.366 0.458 0.353 0.337 0.539 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Country and time dummies included but not reported 
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Table 5. First-differences results. Insurance variable is Private total expenditure (/per capita, US$ PPP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES MRIs MRIs MRIs PTCA PTCA PTCA  R&D R&D R&D 
          
AR(1) t-1 -0.110   0.182   1.395**   
 (0.154)   (0.163)   (0.624)   
AR(2) t-1  -0.134   0.133   1.362**  
  (0.169)   (0.239)   (0.537)  
AR(5) t-1   -0.0794   0.146   0.712* 
   (0.153)   (0.170)   (0.359) 
Female -39.11 -40.08 -33.55 65.20*** 65.03*** 56.53** 174.9 172.1 205.2 
 (23.56) (23.59) (22.94) (23.46) (23.32) (24.18) (134.6) (133.7) (173.2) 
Pop15to64 -0.909 -1.418 -0.0734 36.74*** 36.47*** 26.56** -49.30 -54.51* -23.85 
 (9.408) (9.164) (9.310) (11.42) (11.63) (12.17) (30.96) (28.13) (35.50) 
Pop65over -0.834 -1.911 -3.066 10.57 11.06 -0.413 -50.02 -57.87** 3.473 
 (8.066) (7.482) (7.405) (11.28) (11.37) (10.92) (33.19) (27.46) (38.47) 
Beds 0.0572 0.0640 0.0285 0.0654 0.0663 0.0345 0.734 0.830 0.397* 
 (0.0464) (0.0467) (0.0714) (0.0574) (0.0589) (0.0515) (0.482) (0.626) (0.218) 
GDP 0.458 0.474 0.501 -1.562*** -1.551*** -1.370*** -0.987 -0.976 2.095 
 (0.495) (0.489) (0.521) (0.393) (0.390) (0.446) (1.750) (1.819) (1.377) 
          
Observations 237 234 217 230 229 220 181 176 160 
R-squared 0.561 0.465 0.447 0.412 0.409 0.468 0.327 0.317 0.477 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Country and time dummies included but not reported 
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Table 6. First-difference results. Insurance variable is Government total expenditure (/per capita, US$ PPP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES MRIs MRIs MRIs PTCA PTCA PTCA  R&D R&D R&D 
          
AR(1) t-1 -0.0675   -0.392   -0.302   
 (0.239)   (0.298)   (1.146)   
AR(2) t-1  -0.0106   -0.182   -0.0527  
  (0.194)   (0.199)   (0.918)  
AR(5) t-1   -0.0371   -0.128   0.394 
   (0.209)   (0.167)   (0.446) 
Female -33.97 -35.22 -30.32 71.69*** 69.28*** 59.83** 126.0 124.8 161.1 
 (23.26) (23.63) (24.91) (25.03) (24.25) (23.90) (139.7) (134.3) (157.0) 
Pop15to64 -0.639 -1.020 -0.140 36.10*** 36.07*** 25.96** -46.29* -51.65* -15.29 
 (9.680) (9.624) (9.267) (11.20) (11.44) (11.83) (26.76) (26.32) (34.93) 
Pop65over -1.536 -2.710 -3.361 10.86 11.38 0.146 -45.97* -53.12* 15.08 
 (8.120) (7.519) (7.423) (11.49) (11.35) (10.91) (22.94) (26.00) (37.44) 
Beds 0.0544 0.0603 0.0268 0.0609 0.0631 0.0298 0.722 0.816 0.372 
 (0.0469) (0.0485) (0.0701) (0.0596) (0.0612) (0.0541) (0.515) (0.673) (0.225) 
GDP 0.414 0.428 0.487 -1.476*** -1.497*** -1.312*** -0.655 -0.715 2.372 
 (0.503) (0.499) (0.523) (0.393) (0.392) (0.425) (1.827) (1.923) (1.406) 
          
Observations 237 234 217 230 229 220 181 176 160 
R-squared 0.558 0.461 0.445 0.418 0.411 0.468 0.294 0.293 0.466 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Country and time dummies included but not reported 
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The only other coefficients of note are those on the variables defining the proportion of females, the 
population aged between 15 and 65 and the GDP per capita. Generally in all sets of regressions 
these are always positive for the population variables and negative for GDP in the PTCA case. Noting 
that the equations are run in differences, the growth in PTCA surgery may partly reflect surgical 
intervention on less severe patients, consistent with the findings by Cutler and Huckman (2003). 
Coronary heart disease, which PTCA treats, may present as less severe in female and younger 
patients. With respect to GDP it is more difficult to find an explanation. However, given that we are 
estimating in differences, it may simply be that income growth slows technology uptake for PTCA as 
population could present better health status that do not require surgical intervention (but other 
type of treatment intervention), all other factors considered.       
Conclusion 
       
  While it has long been believed that the Weisbrod (1991) propositions hold and that there is an 
inexorable link between the broadening and deepening of private health insurance coverage and the 
development of new health care technologies, there has been little explicit empirical examination of 
this thesis. In this study we have attempted to produce empirical tests of this thesis and find 
supportive evidence, at the aggregate level of a positive, dynamic relationship between private 
health care expenditure, including private insurance, and health care technology development. The 
mechanism for this relationship is consistent with the Weisbrod view that increasing coverage of 
health care insurance does lead to an incentive to provide new technology. 
 
   Moreover, although suggestive, while the results do support the Weisbrod hypothesis that 
insurance coverage leads to the development of new technologies through R&D, there is no support 
that insurance coverage in general leads to greater up-take of these technologies; at least as 
illustrated by MRI scanners and PTCA procedures. Moreover, the results do not support a cost-
containing effect of governmental expenditures on health care R&D, as no statistical significant 
relationship was found to exist between these variables. 
 
    While an important step in attempting to pursue the Weisbrod hypothesis empirically, our results 
are indicative and better data, possibly on individual technologies would undoubtedly be worthwhile 
pursuing to produce a more substantive study. Given the many statistical difficulties in establishing 
causation, as associated with the dynamic nature of the relationship and issues of endogeneity, this 
study is a mere first step; but one that does at least provide partial, indicative support for the 
Weisbrod thesis as outlined some 20 years ago. 
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